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Clear-Sighted Statistics: An OER Textbook
Module 19: Wrapping Up
“The first principle is that you must not fool yourself—and you are the
easiest person to fool.”1
-- Richard P. Feynman
Theoretical Physicist
“Cargo Cult Science”
1974
“One of the most frustrating aspects of the journal business is the null
hypothesis. It just will not go away.… It is impossible to drag authors away
from their p values, and the more zeros after the decimal point, the harder
people cling to them. It is almost as if all the statistics courses in the world
stopped after introducing Type I error….Perhaps p values are like
mosquitoes. They have an evolutionary niche somewhere and no amount of
scratching, swatting, or spraying will dislodge them….investigators must
learn to argue for the [practical] significance of their results without
reference to inferential statistics.”2
-- John P. Campbell
Editor, Journal of Applied Psychology
“Some Remarks From the Outgoing Editor”
1982
“Sir Ronald [Fisher] has befuddled us, mesmerized us, and led us down the
primrose path. I believe that the almost universal reliance on merely refuting
the null hypothesis as the standard method for corroborating substantive
theories in the soft areas [personality and social psychology] is a terrible
mistake, is basically unsound, poor scientific strategy, and one of the worse
things that ever happened in the history of psychology.”3
-- R. Chris Fraley
Psychologist, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Cited in The Cult of Statistical Significance
I. Introduction
In this, our final, module, we will:
1) Recap the key lessons of Clear-Sighted Statistics.
2) Discuss what we did not cover and what would be covered in more advanced
courses.

3) Discuss the growing criticism of NHST as we report on how the science of
statistics is advancing and how these developments will probably change the
ways inferential statistics will be conducted in the future.
II. Statistics in a “Post-Truth” Society and the Need for Informed Skepticism
Throughout Clear-Sighted Statistics, we have differentiated descriptive statistics or
exploratory data analysis from inferential statistics. We noted that both descriptive and
inferential statistics are prone to errors and distortions. Knaves willfully distort data for
self-interested ends. Fools misapply statistical techniques and arrive at dubious
conclusions because they do not understand what they are doing. The damage caused by
knaves and fools plagues us and may even lead to destructive cynicism. But, when properly
performed, statistical analysis can help us understand more clearly what the data means
and establish a more solid foundation for our findings and our decisions.
A key lesson you should learn from Clear-Sighted Statistics is that whenever you
conduct a statistical analysis, you should do so with transparency and honesty.
Transparency means that we should tell our audience how the data were acquired, what
techniques were employed, and what questions remain unanswered. Honesty means that
we should clearly state the limitations of our approach and our findings.
The late John Wilder Tukey, who taught at Princeton University and worked at Bell
Laboratories, was one of history’s greatest descriptive statistics experts. He was aware of
how descriptive statistics in general and data visualization (charts) in particular can
mislead us. In Module 4, we showed how knaves and fools distort data with charts. The
following quote by Dr. Tukey’s highlights his concern about the misuse of charts:
“Visualization is often used for evil—twisting insignificant data changes and making them
look meaningful. Don’t do that crap if you want to be my friend. Present results clearly and

honestly. If something isn’t working—those reviewing results need to know.”4 Dead men
like Professor Tukey do not need our friendship, but a free, democratic society needs its
citizens to be able to distinguish fact from fiction. To be able to do this, citizens need
statistical literacy because, as we have shown, numbers can trick us. Unscrupulous people
will try to fool the innumerate.
Inferential statistics is also prone to distortions by fools and knaves. Inferential
statistics estimates unknown population parameters on the basis of sample statistics.
Whenever we draw a sample, we risk random sampling error, that is when the sample
statistics do not equal the population parameter, which is usually unknown. We cannot
escape sampling error. It is a natural consequence of drawing samples from populations.
Sampling error is not the result of human error. Confidence intervals and NHST can help us
measure the risk of sampling error. Poorly conducted studies, however, are also vulnerable
to a host of systematic errors, which result from human error. Systematic errors are often a
more serious problem than sampling errors.
Whenever we deal with inferential statistics, we must remember that these analyses
are based on probability. When we estimate parameters using confidence intervals at a 95
percent confidence level, we are saying that if we conducted repeated surveys, the
parameter will be within the confidence interval for 95 percent of the surveys. Facts based
on samples are probabilistic. We do not have 100 percent certainty. This is why we never
consider the null hypothesis to be true when we fail to reject it. Similarly, when we reject
the null hypothesis, we are not declaring the alternate hypothesis true. When rejecting the
null hypothesis, all we are saying is that the data do not support the null hypothesis.
Anything stronger is folly that divulges the author’s hubris.

While often misinterpreted, p-values merely use probability theory to measure how
compatible the data are with the null hypothesis. Rejecting or failing to reject the null
hypothesis says nothing about the size of the effect. In addition, statistical significance does
not imply any practical, real-world significance. We could fail to reject the null hypothesis
even though the effect has practical, real-world importance. As we have shown, we could
also reject the null hypothesis when the effect has no practical implication. It is only with
multiple replications of a study’s results that a research hypothesis might begin to rise to
the level of a theory.
To repeat, facts are not 100 percent certain. This should lead us to two attitudes:
Humility and skepticism. As for humility, we must not overstate the importance of our
findings. And, we must remain skeptical and open to new information that might change
our findings. One of the best descriptions of scientific skepticism comes from data scientist
Cathy O’Neil, author of Weapons of Math Destruction: How Big Data Increases Inequality and
Threatens Democracy. In in her pamphlet, On Being a Data Skeptic, Dr. O’Neil writes:
A skeptic is someone who maintains a consistently inquisitive attitude
toward facts, opinions, or (especially) beliefs stated as facts. A skeptic asks
questions when confronted with a claim that has been taken for granted.
That’s not to say a skeptic brow-beats someone for their beliefs, but rather
that they set up reasonable experiments to test those beliefs.5
Following the advice of the late Richard P. Feynman, delivered in his famous
commencement address to the 1974 graduating class of the California Institute of
Technology, we must be aware of the risks of fooling ourselves. For decades, statisticians
have been debating whether inferential statistics as it is taught and conducted, is blinding
us to the real implications of our data. We will turn to the short-comings of NHST in Section
IV of this module.

III. Where We Go From Here: What is Covered in More Advanced Courses
Statistics is a multifaceted discipline fundamental to so many fields that its breadth cannot
be adequately covered in an introductory course. Most disciplines in the social sciences and
many in the natural sciences use statistical techniques even though they often employ
widely different approaches. The broad application of statistics was noted by Tukey, who
famously said, “The best thing about being a statistician is that you get to play in everyone’s
backyard.”6
Clear-Sighted Statistics was written to introduce students to the basic statistical
methods used in business and the social sciences. More advanced statistics courses delve
deeper into inferential statistics as well as other topics. Let’s discuss some of these new
areas that would be introduced before we discuss some of the more advanced concerns
about inferential statistics that are currently being discussed by practitioners.
A) New Topics
New topics include: 1) Time series analysis and forecasting, 2) Decision Theory, 3)
Statistical Process Control, and 4) Meta-Analysis.
Time series analysis involves analyzing data that have been collected over time.
You will recall that this type of data is called longitudinal data. A goal of time series analysis
is forecasting the future, which is a serious issue for decision-makers in business and
government.
Time series analysis is based on four types of trends:
1. Secular Trends: The long-term non-periodic variation in the longitudinal
data. The timescale used is a key determinant on whether longitudinal data
are perceived as a secular trend. Examples of secular trends include: 1) The
aging of the population in advanced post-industrial countries, 2) Expansion
of digital technologies, 3) The reliance on fossil fuels like coal, oil, and natural
gas, and 4) Trends in global warming.

2. Cyclical Variations: These are oscillating movements in time series data.
The business cycle with its swings between boom and bust are a classic
example of cyclical variations.
3. Seasonal Variations: These are repeated patterns of changes in time series
data within a year. Ice cream sales on the Coney Island boardwalk, for
example, have a distinct seasonal variation. The number of people employed
at ski resorts or sales of Christmas trees are also longitudinal data with
strong seasonal variations.
4. Irregular or Random Variations: These are variations in the time series
data that do not follow a predictable model and are, therefore, not
predictable. An example of irregular or random variation would be the
impact on the American economy of impeaching the President of the United
States.
With time series data, we often calculate moving or rolling averages in an attempt to
smooth random fluctuations in the data so that trends might be easier to detect.
With a moving average, individual observations are adjusted by the mean of that
observation and the observations that precede and follow it. Moving averages are
often used in financial analysis. Moving averages are considered a trend-following or
lagging indicator because they are based on historical data.
Decision Theory deals with a branch of statistical science that evaluates decisionmakers’ choices based on the possible outcomes that might occur in an uncertain future.
With statistical decision theory, statistical information informs the decision-maker of the
uncertainties—the probabilities—involved in a decision. In Module 7, Basic Concepts of
Probability, we briefly discussed Pascal’s Wager as a rudimentary example of decision
theory. Decision theory is a major topic in graduate-level management curriculum.
Statistical Process Control, SPC, is a collection of techniques used to improve the
quality of manufacturing processes. W. Edwards Deming was a leading innovator in SPC.
One of the best known SPC techniques, Six Sigma (6σ), was developed by William B. Smith

at Motorola in the 1980s. Six Sigma is a data-driven process that seeks to reduce
manufacturing errors to no more than 3.4 out of a million randomly selected production
units. The name, Six Sigma, comes from the fact that the error goal of one in 3.4 million
would be six standard deviations from the mean.7
Meta-Analysis is a collection of quantitative procedures that synthesizes the
findings from a review of the research on the topic under investigation. We will briefly
discuss meta-analysis in Section IV.
B) A Deeper Investigation Into Inferential Statistics
1) Effect Size, Statistical Power, and the Probability of Type II Errors
Effect size, practical versus statistical significance, statistical power, and the probability of
Type II errors receive limited attention in introductory statistics courses if they are even
mentioned at all. Advanced statistics courses would delve more deeply into these topics.
NHST focuses on whether an effect exists (the alternate hypothesis) or whether it does not
exist (the null hypothesis).
In contrast to most introductory textbooks, Clear-Sighted Statistics presented an
elementary discussion of effect sizes. We used the tables for the interpretation of effect
sizes which Jacob Cohen cautiously introduced in his ground-breaking book, Statistical
Power Analysis in the Social Sciences. These thresholds have become the standard way to
interpret the magnitude of effect size. Gene Glass, one of the leading developers of metaanalysis and an effect size theorist, argued against reducing effect size to “tee shirt” sizes.
Glass and his co-authors wrote:
There is no wisdom whatsoever in attempting to associate regions of the
effect size metric with descriptive adjectives such as “small,” “moderate,”
“large,” and the like. Dissociated from a context of decision and comparative
value, there is little inherent value to an effect size of 3.5 or .2. Depending on

what benefits can be achieved at what cost, an effect size of 2.0 might be
“poor” and one of .1 might be “good.”8
There is much more to learn about effect sizes. There are many types of effect size
each with their own advantages, disadvantages, and applications. A more nuanced
interpretation of effect size than the one presented in Clear-Sighted Statistics should be
studied in advanced courses because the magnitude of the effect size helps us determine
whether our findings have practical significance. Practical significance focuses on a very
important question: Do the findings have real world importance? In addition, we did not
develop confidence intervals for effect sizes, which some contemporary statisticians argue
is very important.
2) ANOVA Tests:
Advanced statistics courses would explore more sophisticated ANOVA analyses:
1. One-Way Repeated Measures ANOVA: These ANOVA tests make repeated
measures of over time.
2. Two-Way Anova Without Replication: An ANOVA Test with two sets of
independent variables or treatments. Excel’s Data Analysis ToolPak can
conduct this test.
3. Two-Way Anova With Replication: An ANOVA Test with two sets of
independent variables or treatments. Replication refers to whether the
researcher is replicating the test with multiple groups. Excel’s Data Analysis
ToolPak can conduct this test.
4. Factorial ANOVA: These tests are similar to two-way ANOVA test with
additional independent variables, treatments, or factors.
5. MANOVA: Multivariate Analysis of Variance: An ANOVA test with more than
one dependent variable.
6. ANCOVA (Analysis of Covariance): An extension of ANOVA used to
determine whether the treatments are equal across independent variables.
7. MANCOVA (Multivariate Analysis of Covariance): An extension of
ANCOVA for multiple dependent variables.

8. Kruskal-Wallis H test: A nonparametric version of a One-Way ANOVA test.
3) Regression:
While Clear-Sighted Statistics covered simple linear regression, advanced statistics courses
focus on more sophisticated types of regression. These include:
1. Multiple Regression: Linear regression for modeling the relationship
between one dependent variable and more than one independent or
predictor variables.
2. Spearman’s Rho: A nonparametric test of the strength of the association
between two variables.
3. Kendall’s Tau: A nonparametric test of the strength of the association
between two ordinal-level variables.
4. Logistic Regression: A regression model used when the dependent variable
is binary: Either/Or, Yes/No, etc.
5. Multinomial Logistic Regression: A logistic regression model with more
than two outcomes.
6. Structural Equation Modeling: Very sophisticated models that use
mathematical and computer algorithms to construct causal models.
4) Nonparametric Techniques
There are a variety of sophisticated tests used by analysts to determine whether
parametric tests like z-tests, t-tests, or ANOVA tests are appropriate. These tests would be
covered in more advanced statistics courses. Dedicated statistical software, like SPSS,
makes running these tests very easy. More advanced statistics classes would introduce
dedicated statistical software like SPSS, Stata, or R to test the assumptions of parametric
tests. Should our data fail to meet the requirements for parametric tests, we would use the
appropriate nonparametric test. We should consider using nonparametric techniques
when:

•

The data are not normally distributed.

•

The sample size is too small to run parametric tests (of course, small
samples reduce statistical power and increase the risk of Type II errors).

•

The data contain outliers that cannot be removed.

•

The data are heavily skewed, and as a result, a decision is made to use the
median instead of the mean.

While nonparametric tests have less statistical power than parametric tests, they
are more robust. Recall that robustness means the test provides useful results even when
one or more key assumptions are violated.
While Clear-Sighted Statistics covered only one nonparametric technique, chi-square
tests, advanced statistics courses would cover other nonparametric tests. Table 1 shows
some of the basic parametric tests and their nonparametric equivalents.
Table 1: Parametric Tests and Their Nonparametric Equivalent
Parametric Test
Nonparametric Tests
One-sample z-test, One-sample t-test
Sign test
One-sample z-test, One-sample t-test
Wilcoxon Signed Rank test
Two-sample t-test for independent means
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test
One-way ANOVA test
Kruskal-Wallis test and Mood’s Median test
Two-way ANOVA test
Friedman test
Coefficient of Correlation
Spearman Rank Correlation
5) Bayesian Inference:
We briefly touched on Bayes’ Theorem when we reviewed probability. Bayesian inference,
however, is a sophisticated topic that might be covered in more advanced statistics courses.
Historically, statisticians tend to be a quarrelsome lot. Tukey joked that the “collective noun
for a group of statisticians is a quarrel.”9 One of the longest and most acrimonious debates
in statistics has been between the frequentists and the Bayesians. Nearly all introductory
statistics textbooks approach statistics from a frequentist orientation, which is based on

objective (classical and empirical) probability. Confidence intervals and the
Fisher/Neyman-Pearson NHST are central to frequentist techniques. Bayesian inference is
based on Bayes’ Theorem and subjective probability.
While frequentists still dominate the science of statistics, Bayesian inference has
been slowly gaining acceptance since the 1970s. Its advocates see Bayesian inference as
either a useful supplement to frequentist statistical inference, or its replacement.
We have spent a good deal of time on frequentist NHST, which has become the sine
qua non of inferential statistics and the cornerstone of most social sciences. Yet, NHST is not
widely used in physics, chemistry, or biology.

Let’s devote a couple of paragraphs to Bayesian inference. This discussion is based
on two sources: 1) Ben Lambert’s introductory textbook, and a wonderful open access
peer-review monograph written by Alonso Ortega and Gorka Navarrete.10
Bayesian inference uses Bayes’ Theorem to update evidence in support of both the
null and alternate hypotheses as more information becomes available. Advocates of
Bayesian inference contend that this approach allows us to move away from the
dichotomous frequentist approach that requires either rejecting or failing to reject the null
hypothesis. Its advocates contend that using Bayesian inferences gives researchers a better
perspective on the data and the extent to which it supports the null hypothesis or the
alternate hypothesis. This is something traditional NHST does not do. As we discussed in
Module 13, NHST focuses on whether the data falsifies the null hypothesis. A central
feature of NHST is the p-value, which is evidence against the null hypothesis or what one
philosopher of science said is the degree to which the data are embarrassed by the null

hypothesis.11 P-values provide evidence against the null hypothesis. It never produces
evidence in favor of the null or alternate hypotheses.12
According to the Bayesians, frequentist NHST has three serious flaws:13
1) It only provides evidence against the plausibility of the null hypothesis, but
fails to provide any evidence in favor of the alternate hypothesis.
2) Its inferences are made on hypothetical data distributions (z-, t-, F-, or χ2
distributions, among others.) instead of being based on actual data.
3) It does not provide clear rules for stopping data collection and as a result any
null hypothesis can be rejected when the sample is large enough.
The advantage of Bayesian inference , its advocates argue, is that our degree of
belief in the null and alternate hypotheses—our “prior knowledge”—is updated in light of
new data. Researchers, therefore, are encouraged to think about the magnitude of evidence
that supports the existence of an effect, instead of a dichotomous way of thinking where an
effect either exists or does not exist.
Bayesian inference obtains information from three sources:
1) A model that specifies how latent parameters (φ) generate data (D).
2) Prior information about those parameters.
3) The observed data (likelihood).
These sources lead to the construction of Bayes Factors, which are the ratio of the
likelihood, or probability of the alternate hypothesis to the probability of the null
hypothesis. The Bayes Factor can be interpreted as the strength of evidence for the
competing hypotheses.
Equation 1 shows the formula for calculating Bayes Factors:
𝑃(𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎|𝐻1 )
𝑃(𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎|𝐻0 )
Equation 1: Bayes Factor Equation
𝐵𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑠 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 =

Table 2 shows how Bayes Factors are interpreted:14
Table 2: Bayes Factor Interpretation.

Bayes Factor
> 100
30 – 100
10 - 30
3 - 10
1-3
1
1/3 - 1
1/3 – 1/10
1/10 – 1/30
1/30 – 1/100
<1/100

Interpretation
Extreme evidence for the alternate hypothesis
Very strong evidence for the alternate hypothesis
Strong evidence for the alternate hypothesis
Moderate evidence for the alternate hypothesis
Anecdotal evidence for the alternate hypothesis
No evidence
Anecdotal evidence for the null hypothesis
Moderate evidence for the null hypothesis
Strong evidence for the null hypothesis
Very strong evidence for null hypothesis
Extreme evidence for the null hypothesis

A major obstacle to Bayesian inference, besides the hostility of frequentists like
Ronald A. Fisher, was that it requires complex calculations. Starting in the 1990s, however,
Bayesian software was introduced. Here are just a few statistical applications for Bayesian
analysis: BayesiaLab, JAGS, JASP, Stan, and WinBugs.
IV. Where is Statistics Going? The Many Second Thoughts About NHST
We may be witnessing a paradigm shift in inferential statistics. In 1962, philosopher of
science, Thomas S. Kuhn coined the term paradigm shift in his widely read book, The
Structure of Scientific Revolutions.15 A paradigm shift is the messy way important changes in
science happen when the scientific community fundamentally alters accepted thinking and
methods. According to Kuhn, there are four stages to a paradigm shift:
1) Normal Science: In this stage the dominant paradigm is active and widely
supported. Kuhn’s examples of normal science include Newtonian physics,
caloric theory, and the theory of electromagnetism. The dominant paradigm
defines how science is conducted.
2) Extraordinary Research: The dominant paradigm becomes suspect when
researchers find anomalies. This throws the scientific discipline into a state of
crisis. “Confronted with anomaly or with crisis,” Kuhn declares, “scientists take a
different attitude toward existing paradigms, and the nature of research changes

accordingly.”16 In essence, scientists begin to experiment with new ideas and
new methods.
3) Adoption of a New Paradigm: Scientists conducting extraordinary research
eventually develop a new paradigm. This is the messy stage. Many scientists
refuse to adopt the new paradigm. To illustrate this point, Kuhn quotes Max
Planck, the German theoretical physicist, “…a new scientific truth does not
triumph by convincing its opponents and making them see the light, but rather
because its opponents die, and a new generation grows up that is familiar with
it.”17 The adoption of a new paradigm takes time because the older scientists
have to die off.
4) Aftermath: The new paradigm becomes dominant. When dominant, it becomes
institutionalized; which is to say, it guides the conduct of science and how the
discipline is taught to students.
A) The NHST Paradigm:
Is the science of statistics now in the midst of a paradigm shift? Is NHST on its way out,
ready for the dustbin of history like the geocentric model of the universe that placed Earth
at its center?
The NHST paradigm was established in the mid-1920s and 1930s. As practiced in
the second half of the twentieth century and the first part of the twenty-first century, NHST
is an amalgam of two different and incompatible approaches. The first approach is Ronald
A. Fisher’s Significance Testing, which gave us the null hypothesis, significance levels, and pvalues. The second approach, called Hypothesis Testing, was developed by Jerzy Neyman
and Egon Pearson, the son of Karl Pearson. The Neyman-Pearson approach gave us two
hypotheses (the null and alternate) and Type I and Type II errors. We need not get into the
details, but Fisher and Neyman strongly disagreed about their approaches to inferential
statistics. Today some of the critics of NHST claim that many of the problems with how
NHST is conducted stem from the inherent incompatibility of Fisher’s significance testing
and Neyman-Pearson’s hypothesis testing.

Critiques of NHST have a long history. Stephen T. Ziliak and Deirdre N. McCloskey,
who are articulate and thought-provoking critics of NHST, point to a long-forgotten letter
written by William Gosset to Egon Pearson in 1926 concerning weaknesses in Fisher’s
approach to Significance Testing. Neyman and Pearson later operationalized Gosset’s
comments in their version of Hypothesis Testing.18
In 1951, Frank Yates, a close colleague of Ronald Fisher, placed an article in the
Journal of the American Statistical Association that praised and criticized significance
testing. Yates wrote that Fisher’s Statistical Methods for Research Workers has caused
researchers to “…pay undue attention to the results of the tests of significance they perform
on their data…and too little to the estimates of the magnitude of the effects they are
estimating.”19
Comments’ similar to Yates’ were made during the next twenty years. In 1966, David
Bakan declared that NHST flaws are apparent to everyone just like the state of undress of
Hans Christian Anderson’s foolish emperor parading around in his underwear to show his
subjects his wonderful invisible robe. Bakan, an advocate of Bayesian inference, wrote,
“…the test of significance does not provide the information concerning
psychological phenomena characteristically attributed to it; and that, furthermore,
a great deal of mischief has been associated with its use. What is said in this
paper is hardly original. It is, in a certain sense, what ‘everybody knows.’ To say
it ‘out loud’ is, as it were, to assume the role of the child who pointed out that the
emperor was really outfitted in his underwear.” (Italics added).”20
In 1970, sociologists Ramon E. Morrison and Denton E. Henkel edited an anthology of
31 articles titled Significance Test Controversy. One contributor compared NHST to “a potent
but sterile intellectual rake [a shamelessly immoral person or knave] who leaves in his merry
path a long train of ravished maidens but no viable scientific offspring.”21

A long-time critic of NHST, Jacob Cohen published an article in 1994 in
American Psychologist entitled “The Earth is Round (p<.05).” Cohen wrote, “After 4
decades of severe criticism, the ritual of null hypothesis significance testing—
mechanical dichotomous decisions around a sacred .05 criterion—still persists.”22
Cohen cites three problems with NHST:
1) The near-universal misinterpretation of p-values as the probability that the null
hypothesis is false.
2) The misinterpretation that the complement of the p-value is the probability of
successful replication of the study.
3) The mistaken assumption that if one rejects the null hypothesis, the theory that
led to the test is affirmed.23
In the quarter century since Cohen’s often-cited article, legions of statisticians have
published critiques of NHST. What’s wrong with NHST? It does not tell us what we want to
know: The probability that the null hypothesis is true. It ignores the size of the effect. And,
as John P. A. Ioannidis, along with other scholars, pointed out most published research
using NHST is false because of low statistical power and the inability to replicate the
studies’ findings.24 In “Why Most Published Research Findings are False,” Ioannidis
developed six corollaries, which take us beyond the narrow issue of NHST:
1) The smaller the sample sizes, the less likely the research findings are “true.”
2) The smaller the effect sizes, the less likely the research findings are “true.”
3) The greater the number and the lesser the selection of tested relationships in
a scientific field, the less likely the research findings are “true.” Which is to
say, the more variables the less likely the model is “true.”
4) The greater the flexibility in designs, definitions, outcomes, and analytical
modes in a scientific field, the less likely the research findings are “true.”
5) The greater the financial and other interests and prejudices in a scientific
field, the less likely the research findings are “true.”

6) The hotter a scientific field (with more scientific teams involved), the less
likely the research findings are “true.”
The calls for downplaying NHST testing or replacing it entirely have been
increasing. In 2016, The American Statistician published an editorial on the use of p-values.
In their editorial, Ronald L. Wasserstein and Nicole A, Lazar noted:
Statisticians and others have been sounding the alarm about these matters for
decades, to little avail. We hoped that a statement from the world’s largest
professional association of statisticians [the American Statistical Association] would
open a fresh discussion and draw renewed and vigorous attention to changing the
practice of science with regards to the use of statistical inference.25
This editorial was published under the title, “ASA Statement on P-Values and
Statistical Significance.”
Here is a summary what the author of the ASA editorial said about p-values, which
they define as “…the probability under a specific statistical model that the statistical
summary of the data…would be equal to or more extreme than its observed value:”26
1) P-values indicate how incompatible the data are with a specified statistical
model.
2) P-values do not measure the probability that the studied hypothesis is true, or
the probability that the data were produced by random chance alone.
[Researchers often wish to turn a p-value into a statement about the truth of a
null hypothesis, or about the probability that random chance produced the
observed data. The p-value is neither. It is a statement about data in relation
to a specified hypothetical explanation, and is not a statement about the
explanation itself.]
3) Scientific conclusions and business or policy decisions should not be based
only on whether a p-value passes a specific threshold.
4) Proper inference requires full reporting and transparency.
5) A p-value, or statistical significance, does not measure the size of an effect or
the importance of a result.

6) By itself, a p-value does not provide a good measure of evidence regarding a
model or hypothesis. The statement states that “…data analysis should not
end with the calculation of a p-value when other approaches are appropriate
and feasible.” These approaches include: “…confidence, credibility, or
prediction intervals; Bayesian methods; alternative measures of evidence,
such as likelihood ratios or Bayes Factors; and other approaches such as
decision-theoretic modeling and false discovery rates.”27
This statement, however, stopped short of calling for an end of NHST and its p-values.
In March 2019, the scientific journal Nature published an article by Valentin
Amrhein, Sander Greenland, and Blake McShane calling for the end of NHST. This article
had 800 signatories.28 In addition, during the same week, The American Statistician,
published another editorial on NHST, “Moving to a World Beyond ‘p < 0.05.’” It precedes 43
articles from prominent statisticians that deal with the contentious issue of how to move
beyond NHST.
The authors of this editorial wrote:
The ASA Statement on P-Values and Statistical Significance stopped just short of
recommending that declarations of “statistical significance” be abandoned. We take
that step here. We conclude, based on our review of the [43] articles in this special
issue and the broader literature, that it is time to stop using the term “statistically
significant” entirely. Nor should variants such as “significantly different,” “p < 0.05,”
and “nonsignificant” survive, whether expressed in words, by asterisks in a table, or
in some other way. 29
The editorialists acknowledge that voices in the 43 papers in this issue “do not sing as one.
At times in this editorial and the papers you’ll hear deep dissonance, the echoes of
‘statistics wars’ still simmering today.”30
Clearly inferential statistics may be entering Stage Three of a paradigm shift as
outlined by Kuhn: Adoption of a New Paradigm. The exact details of this new paradigm are
still fuzzy. To quote Yogi Berra, the New York Yankees baseball player, “It’s tough to make
predictions, especially about the future.”31 Throwing caution to the wind, here is a broad

outline of five things to expect. It would be a fool’s errand to predict the likely new
statistical inference techniques with any more detail.
A) The terms statistically significant and statistically insignificant will be
deemphasized, if not banished.
B) The use of the standard 0.05 significance level will decline along with the
preeminence of p-values. The significance levels used, or more likely the confidence
levels, will be selected based on the practical importance of the effect size for the issue
under investigation.
C) Confidence intervals will replace NHST. Confidence intervals, which we described as
the inverse of NHST, provide a range of plausible estimates of the population parameter
rather than a single dichotomous conclusion of “significant or not significant.” As a
consequence, confidence intervals provide more useful information than NHST.32
We looked at the issue of a person’s political affiliation—Republican, Independent,
or Democrat—and their attitude toward the legalization of marijuana. We conducted this
analysis three ways. We performed two different null hypothesis tests and we constructed
confidence intervals.
In Module 15, we used a two-sample z-test for proportions. This test is
unsatisfactory because we can only compare two samples at a time. We would have to
conduct this test three times: 1) Republicans to Independents, 2) Republicans to
Democrats, and 3) Independents to Democrats. The problem with this method is that the
probability of a Type I error would greatly increase.
In Module 17, we again examined this question using a chi-square contingency table.
We concluded that a person’s attitudes toward the legalization of marijuana are dependent

on political affiliations. The problem is that this test is an omnibus test and we would have
to conduct a post hoc analysis to determine which of the three pairs are unequal: 1)
Republicans vs. Independents, 2) Republicans vs. Democrats, and 3) Independents vs.
Democrats. One post hoc analysis is the LSD confidence interval that we used on Module 16
for ANOVA tests. So, why not skip this test and resort to using confidence intervals?
The clearest answer to the question of the association of political affiliation and
attitudes toward the legalization of marijuana is found in Module 11 on confidence
intervals, when we addressed this issue with confidence intervals. Because the confidence
intervals for Republicans, Independents, and Democrats do not overlap, we concluded that
Democrats are more likely to favor the legalization of marijuana than Independents, who
are more likely to favor the legalization of marijuana than Republicans. This conclusion can
be presented is a chart the provides a clear illustration of this conclusion. See Figure 1:
Political Affliation and Attitudes Toward Legalization of Marijuana
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Figure 1: Confidence Interval Chart

D) Effect sizes will be reported using confidence intervals. Researchers will cease
reporting the magnitude of effects in “tee shirt” sizes—small, medium, and large—based on

effect size thresholds developed decades ago. They will use their judgment and the
collective wisdom of experts in the field to determine the practical importance of the effect.
E) Meta-analysis will continue to grow in importance. Meta-analysis is a collection of
statistical techniques for combining the results of multiple studies. Meta-analyses are
useful for reconciling discrepancies regarding the effect size found in the research
literature.
One final point: We are in an uncertain transition to a new paradigm. While
statisticians argue vociferously for one approach or another, it would be easy to fall into a
naïve cynicism. After all, if the leading statisticians are arguing that the methods developed
a hundred years ago are seriously flawed and yet they cannot agree on the best way
forward, you may jump to the conclusion that this statistics stuff is just a bunch of useless
malarkey, hogwash, and hokum. Resist this temptation. All sciences undergo paradigm
shifts. So, stay skeptical. Do not dismiss the discipline of statistics. Remember John Tukey’s
sage advice: “The most important maxim for data analysis to heed, and one which many
statisticians seemed to have shunned is this: ‘Far better an approximate answer to the right
question, which is often vague, than an exact answer to the wrong question, which can
always be made precise.’”33
V. Exercises
1.

What is a major lesson you should have learned from Clear-Sighted Statistics?

2.

Inferential Statistics is based on probability. How does this affect our
understanding of the “truth”?

3.

True or False: Statisticians are convinced that the way Statistics is taught and
practiced is beyond reproach.

4.

When Gov. Cuomo speaks about COVID, he uses a 3-day average, not a daily
average. Why?

5.

When should nonparametric tests be considered?

6.

Multiple Choice: Compared to parametric tests, nonparametric tests have…
o More Statistical Power
o The same Statistical Power
o Less Statistical Power

7.

Multiple Choice: p-values provide…
o No useful information whatsoever
o Evidence in favor of the null hypothesis
o Evidence in favor of the alternate hypothesis
o Evidence against the null hypothesis

8.

Multiple Choice: Bayesian Statistics…
o Is based on Bayes Theorem and subjective probability
o Updates evidence supporting both the H0 and H1
o Rejects the dichotomous approach of traditional NHST
o Was not eagerly adopted by most statisticians
o All of the above

9.

True or False: Since at least 1950, Statisticians have criticized NHST

10. In Jacob Cohen’s article, “The Earth is Round (p < 0.05),” what are his criticisms
of NHST?
11. What are John P. A. Ioannidis’ six corollaries on NHST?
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